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Was Korea's Financial Crisis Self-fulfilling?*
Won-Am Park**
The second generation model, which emphasizes multiple equilibria
and self-fulfilling expectations, is distinguished from its predecessors,
which emphasize market fundamentals and unique equilibrium.
However, a sudden outbreak of vulnerability that is triggered by market
panic can also be explained by market fundamentals. This study shows
that the Korean crisis was largely triggered by real appreciation,
excessive lending, and a lack of adequate reserve protection, while
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies as well as capital inflows are
less central. Tests for self-fulfilling crisis do not  support the
relationships among market fundamentals before the crisis. The real
appreciation due to a weak yen and a strong won, excessive bank
lending, and the mismanagement of foreign reserves led to the Korean
crisis.
JEL classification: F3
Keywords: market fundamentals, self-fulfilling expectations, exchange
market pressure, logit model, Korea
1.  INTRODUCTION
As the Asian crisis that began in Thailand quickly reached Korea, she
inevitably requested for IMF loans on Nov. 21, 1997. At the time, Malaysia
and the Philippines did not ask for IMF loans, but they were in no better
condition than the crisis-hit countries of Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea.
However, the economic depression of these nations did not last long: all of
them have shown a remarkable rebound. In particular. Korea recorded double
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digit growth in 1999 after negative 6 percent growth in the previous year. This
dramatic turnaround provides the momentum to reconsider the causes and
cures of the crisis.
Immediately after the crisis, many pointed out the structural problems of
the crisis countries. In the case of Korea, many argued that it suffered from
crisis due to lax financial supervision and regulation for financial institutions
and the significant mismatch in the sources and uses of funds, despite it
maintained the sound macro-fundamentals compared to other Asian
neighbors.1) Of course, the dissenting view that investors panic triggered a
sudden reversal of capital inflows is also popular.2) The swift recovery of the
Asian economies strengthened the latter view of financial panic due to self-
fulfilling expectations. For example, Krugman (1999) switched his position to
the self-fulfilling expectations view from market fundamentals view that
holds for structural factors such as moral hazard, as he witnessed the spillover
of crises (Krugman, 1998).
Studies on currency crises have been vigorously pursued for the past two
decades.3) After the Mexican crisis there was extensive research on the
contagion effect that affected many nations.4) These studies were based on
cross-country data and allow us to investigate the general pattern of crisis
beyond the experience of an individual country. However, cross country
studies cannot properly reveal the characteristics of each individual country,
and inter-country comparison is at best limited. The Korean crisis is a unique
experience in that Korea had played a major role in the Asian miracle and
encountered crisis despite its relatively stable macroeconomic conditions.
This paper investigates empirically the causes of the Korean crisis. The
findings are compared with existing studies based on multi-country data to
establish relevant insight into the Korean crisis. In section 2, a simple
exposition is made to compare a traditional and self-fulfilling currency crisis.
Some of the difficulties in empirically identifying either type of model are
                                                
1) Studies such as Krugman (1998), Kaminsky (1998), Park and Choi (1998) emphasize
weaknesses in economic structure and market fundamentals as the primary causes of the
financial crises in Asia.
2) Radelet and Sachs (1998, 1999), Lee and Lee (1998) and Krugman(1999).
3) In advanced countries, one can refer to Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995), and in case
of developing countries to Frankel and Rose (1996) or Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b).
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) deal with both cases.
4) Calvo and Reinhart (1995), Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996), and Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco(1996b) are good references.
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also pointed out. In section 3, a crisis index is constructed and market
fundamentals that can explain the movement in crisis index are introduced. In
section 4, the multiple regressions are applied to ferret out market
fundamentals followed by the test on the self-fulfilling properties of crisis. In
section 5, the same empirical investigations are implemented adopting the
logit model to check the robustness of the results in the previous section. The
final section concludes the study.
2.  MODELS OF CRISIS
Many countries have experienced various types of crises over the decades.
Since the patterns of the crises have differed significantly across countries and
time, crisis model has also adapted to changing patterns. The first generation
model tried to explain crisis by focusing on the fiscal deficit, reflecting the
experiences in Latin America where an increased money supply for deficit
financing led to a sharp depreciation of domestic currency (Krugman, 1979).
However, the EMU crisis in 1992 differed from the Latin American case and
engendered the second generation model. Obstfeld (1994) focused on the
changing expectations of the market participants for the response of the
government when it was caught in conflict among goals in the exchange rate
and other macroeconomic objectives. The authority can be forced to change
the current policy stance because market participants expect that its policy
cannot be sustained. Crisis erupts as market participants expect that policy
change is inevitable.
2.1. Model Comparisons
   
The difference between the first and second generation model lies primarily
in the possibility of multiple equilibria. The first generation model stresses the
situation in which the authority cannot maintain the fixed level of the
exchange rate, as foreign reserves deplete due to weak market fundamentals.
However, if the authority cannot defend the exchange rate by using reserves, a
typical reaction would be to raise interest rates by reducing the money supply.
As market participants expect future depreciation with the depletion of
reserves, the cost of maintaining the fixed level of exchange rate increases
and the authorities are forced to give up the fixed exchange rate. This
expected policy response is missing in the first generation model where the
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authority passively responds to the speculative attack. The expected policy
changes allow multiple equilibria and set in a self-fulfilling crisis.
When expectations are self-fulfilling, crisis can erupt abruptly, and it is
virtually impossible to predict crisis. However, a simple comparison of the
two models can create misunderstandings.
First, a crisis associated with structural vulnerability is observationally
equivalent to a self-fulfilling crisis. Speculators increase their holdings of
foreign currency when they realize that the authority cannot maintain the
exchange rate, forcing the abrupt depreciation of currency. The difference is
the timing of crisis. While the timing is determined by market fundamentals
in the first generation model, it is arbitrarily set according to the self-fulfilling
expectations of speculators in the second generation model.
Second, it is very difficult to predict crisis whether it is self-fulfilling or not.
As pointed out, the major difference between two models is whether one can
pin down the timing of crisis. Even with unique equilibrium of the first
generation model that allows one to determine, ex post facto, the timing of
crisis, predicting it remains very challenging.
Third, those who emphasize the self-fulfilling nature of crisis often assert
that the crisis occurs by the speculation, even in the absence of structural
problems. However, they miss the important point that the second generation
model envisions the triggering mechanism in the presence of structural
weaknesses. The model does not suggest that crisis occurs irrespective of
market fundamentals, but that the self-fulfilling crisis occurs when the
economy enters a crisis zone due to structural weaknesses. The difference is
the timing. While the first generation model admits the immediate crisis when
the economy enters a crisis zone, the second generation model points out the
possibility of crisis at any point of time within the crisis zone.
In this context, Krugman (1996) downplayed the self-fulfilling nature of
crisis. He noted that the conflicts among policy objectives do not necessarily
ensure a random occurrence of crisis, even if policy is formulated
endogenously. He showed that when market participants expect a gradual
worsening of market fundamentals, the economy tends to have a unique
equilibrium and crisis erupts as soon as the economy heads into a crisis zone.
Moreover, Garber (1996) points out the observational equivalence of crisis
development between the two models. It is very hard to predict crisis not only
because expectations are inherently arbitrary but also expectations about
future market fundamentals can change. For instance, if the crisis does not
occur when the economy enters the crisis zone, this could be due both to the
Was Korea's Financial Crisis Self-fulfilling? 305
arbitrary nature of expectations and changing expectations about the future
fundamentals. Therefore the difference between the first and second
generation model is not as striking as it might look, since both models allow
for the possibilities that crisis can develop when market fundamentals are
weakened and that crisis can develop in an abrupt manner. We conduct an
empirical investigation into the causes of the Korean crisis from the
perspective that economic vulnerability or financial fragility that are the
building blocks for the second generation model can be explained by the
development of market fundamentals (Kaminsky, 1998).
2.2. Contagion Effect
As the Asian economies recover astonishingly from the crisis, the view that
underpins structural weaknesses is losing support in favor of a competing
view that stresses investors' panic and the associated withdrawal of funds
from the region. During six months around the Asian financial crises, almost
100 billion dollars were withdrawn with a subsequent upheaval of the
exchange rate and interest rate. The massive outflows of capital from the
region support the view that Korea's problem was not structural but largely
attributable to the contagion effect of the crises of the Thai baht, Indonesian
rupiah, and Malaysian ringgit. Radelet and Sachs (1999) reaffirmed their
position that crisis was mainly triggered by investors' panic rather than weak
fundamentals. Krugman who proposed the moral hazard problem in the
region (Krugman, 1998) acknowledged the role of contagion (Krugman,
1999).
The contagion effect usually represents the contemporaneous or in-a-series
occurrences of crises. Widespread crises in the region can be created by both
market fundamentals and self-fulfilling elements. The mere fact that the
region suffered from a series of speculative attacks does not support the claim
that self-fulfilling expectations are the primary reason for the contagion.
Masson (1998) usefully categorized three contagion effects. First, a
monsoonal effect is the influence on developing countries of changes in the
economic situation of advanced countries. The developing countries that rely
excessively on foreign financing and have weak financial markets are
susceptible to common shock originating from the advanced countries. For
example, as the U.S. interest rates shot up in the early 1980s, Latin American
countries experienced debt crises. Moreover, the weakening of the yen after
1996 and the deep recession in Japan exacerbated the export environment of
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Asian countries noticeably.
Second, the spillover effect is related to the change incurred by other
countries through trade and financial linkage.5) For example, when a country
in the region devalues its currency, competing nations are forced to depreciate
their currencies in order to remain competitive. The financial instability in one
country also triggers massive outflow from the region due to heightened risk,
extending financial instability to neighboring countries.
Third, the pure contagion effect refers to a situation in which crisis is
driven by self-fulfilling expectations that are not directly related to market
fundamentals. For example, when a country is hit by a crisis, expectations
about future depreciation can develop for those neighboring countries that
have no close trade or financial linkages.
Among the three effects, the monsoonal and the spillover effect are related
to market fundamentals rather than self-fulfilling expectations. The common
shocks of the Japanese slowdown and marked depreciation of the yen can
deteriorate the market fundamentals through the trade and financial linkage.
Since both the monsoonal and spillover effect explain the transmission
mechanism without assuming multiple equilibria, these should be
distinguished from a self-fulfilling crisis model with multiple equilibria.
Distinguishing the three types of the contagion effect is difficult. The East
Asian regional trade keeps growing to occupy the significant portion of the
total trade. Furthermore, the Japanese influence in this region increased after
1985, especially for Korea, as the Japanese yen remained strong up to 1996.6)
   
3 .  CRISIS  INDEX AND MARKET FUNDAMENTALS
The Korean crisis occurred in November 1997 when the government
decided to ask for IMF loans in the wake of a weakening won and worsening
                                                
5) Crisis models based on trade linkage are Gerlach and Smets (1995) and Eichengreen, Rose,
and Wyplosz (1996).
6) Masson (1998) studied the contagion effect during the Mexican crisis and the recent Asian
crisis but found that the multiple equilibria conditions for the pure contagion effect do not
hold in Korea and Malaysia which had a relatively low external debt/GDP ratio. Baig and
Goldfajn (1998) found the increasing correlations among stock price, exchange rates, and
interest rates during the Asian crisis, but this could be due to the monsoonal effect rather
than the pure contagion effect.
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financial market conditions. Existing literature defines the crisis in two
different ways. First, a comprehensive set of standards are applied to define a
crisis chronologically.7)
 Second, quantitative indices such as the exchange market pressure is
constructed to indicate the severity of a crisis. This study resorts to the latter
approach. Because Korea has experienced the crisis for the first time since it
launched the export-led growth strategy, the former approach of episode study
is impossible for Korea.
It was common practice to monitor abrupt changes in exchange rate
associated with sudden changes in capital flows in order to measure the
exchange market pressure (Edwards, 1989; Frankel and Rose, 1996).
However, preventive measures such as raising interest rates or exhausting
foreign reserves to protect exchange rate also exert serious effects on the
domestic economy. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) measured the
exchange market pressure recognizing this chain of events. The so-called
Eichengreen-Rose-Wyplosz index is widely applied in empirical
investigations, among which Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b) and
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997) are notable.
3.1. Crisis Index
We construct the slightly modified Eichengreen-Rose-Wyplosz index. The
exchange market pressure (EMP) is defined as the weighted average of won
depreciation( eD ), percentage point changes of interest rate ( iD ) and
percentage changes in foreign reserves( RD ) from the year earlier. Weights
are the inverse of standard deviation of each variable so that volatile series
affect the exchange market pressure disproportionately. 8)
                                                
7) Refer to Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997).
8) The weights are the inverse of unconditional variance. The won depreciation(Δe) is easured
as the percentage depreciation of the won/dollar exchange rate. The yields of the corporate
onds of three-year maturity are used. The next section performs  sensitivity analysis using
conditional variance. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) and Kaminsky, Lizondo, and
Reinhart (1997) used conditional variance, while Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b) used
unconditional variance.
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where es , is , Rs are standard deviation of eD , iD  and RD  respectively.
The Korean monthly data for the years 1989-97 obtained from data base of
the Bank of Korea are used for empirical investigation, while most studies on
crises use multi-country data. Thus the inherent limitations of this study in
using only Korean time series data prevent us from drawing more general
conclusion. However, multi-county studies cannot escape from the criticism
that they do not offer a study of the Korean crisis because Korea usually
occupies very small portion of the whole data set. In this sense, the panel
study of the Asian crises cannot be viewed as the study of the Korean crisis.
The Korean crisis is very unique in that it was brought about with relatively
sound macroeconomic fundamentals as compared to other Asian countries
such as Thailand and Indonesia. The concentration into the Korean experience
is needed to seek similarities with and differences from existing studies.
The exchange market pressure should be stationary with the percentage
transformation of each component. For this purpose, Franses' (1990) method
was employed to test the existence of seasonal units roots (Maddala  and Kim,
1998). Test results suggest that interest rate, exchange rate, and foreign
reserves all have unit roots. It is further verified that the use of 12D filter is
justified in the case of interest rate.
Figure 1 shows the changes in exchange market pressure, which began to
increase in 1996 and posted a sharp upturn in early 1997, culminating at the
end of 1997 after a brief respite in the middle of 1997. The trend is roughly in
line with the public recognition of the probability of crisis. The exchange
market pressure was also posted high at the end of 1990. After recording a
sizable current account surplus during 1986-89, Korea experienced a sharp
turnaround into current account deficit. Interest rates started to climb,
increasing exchange market pressure.
Figure 2 exhibits the frequency distribution of exchange market pressure.
The frequency increases sharply at interval 9 and 10 but decreases sharply
beyond those intervals.
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Figure 1  Exchange Market Pressures
Figure 2  Frequency Distribution of Exchange Market Pressure
Note: The vertical scale is the frequency. The horizontal axis is the
exchange market pressure divided into 15 intervals.
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3.2. Market Fundamentals
Among a sizable set of market fundamentals that can explain the economic
crisis the twenty variables were selected in view of data availability and crisis
predictability. 9)
The real sector variables are: 1) terms of trade, 2) industrial
inventory/shipment, 3) Korean stock price index (KOSPI), 4) current
account/GDP, 5) real effective exchange rate, 6) trade balance/trade amount,
7) export concentration (exports of five major items/total exports), 8) export
amount, 9) capital account/GDP.
The financial sector variables are: 10) foreign reserves, 11) foreign
liabilities/foreign assets at commercial banks, 12) loans in foreign currency,
13) net foreign liabilities/total deposits at commercial banks, 14) domestic
credit/GDP, 15) M2 multiplier, 16) excess M1 supply,10) 17) M2/foreign
reserve, 18) foreign liablities/total liabilities at monetary institutions, 19)
Standard & Poor's sovereign credit ratings,11) 20) devaluation pressure from
Asian neighbors (weighted average of the real effective exchange rates of
Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Hong Kong).12)
4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE KOREAN CRISIS
4.1. Determinants of the Crisis
We now investigate the link between exchange market pressure and market
fundamentals. Since the financial sector is largely blamed for the crisis, the
financial variables are under close scrutiny.
We can find the determinants for a crisis by regressing the exchange market
pressure on the market fundamentals and selecting those variables that have
                                                
9) They have low noise-to-signal ratio in predicting the Korean crisis when the leading
indicator approach was applied (Park and Choi, 1998).
10) The money demand is assumed to be a function of GDP, CPI inflation and time trend.
11) Standard & Poor's classifies national ratings into 22 categories. Korea's rating worsened
dramatically after October 1997 and was subsequently classified as unfit for investment.
12) The data base of the Bank of Korea is the source of most data. The real effective exchange
rate data of the Morgan Stanley are used. The ratio of the short-term external debt/total
external debt was not included because the data were not available on a monthly basis only
after 1998.
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Table 1  Determinants of the Korean Crisis
current
6-month
moving
average
current
6-month
moving
average
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -1.150(-9.55) -0.765(-4.61) -1.391(-11.55) -1.187(-7.26)
REER 0.032(1.87) -0.075(-3.44) 0.057(3.35) -0.054(-2.20)
Domestic Credit/GDP 0.123(5.54) 0.131(4.37) 0.144(6.35) 0.189(5.95)
M2/reserves 0.113(17.45) 0.119(13.66) 0.118(17.60) 0.126(12.89)
S&P ratings 0.716(3.36) 1.271(5.15)
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.83 0.88 0.78
Note: 1) All explanatory variables are expressed as percentage change from a year
earlier. The estimation period is from January 1990 until December 1997. t-
values are inside the parentheses.
2) Moving average covers the present and five previous months.
the right signs and are significant. If we assume that crisis follows the
traditional pattern, the exchange market pressure as the representative of the
crisis severity can be expressed as a function of market fundmentals. As
explained earlier, even when the crisis arises due to self-fulfilling
expectations, it retains its relationship with market fundamentals until the
economy enters the crisis zone. Afterwards the relationship can change.
Table 1 shows the standard regression results.13) Among the twenty
fundamentals, real effective exchange rate of the Korean won, domestic
credit/GDP, M2/reserves and Standard & Poor's credit ratings turned out to be
statistically significant.14) The expansion in domestic credit, reduction in
foreign reserves or worsening in the credit ratings increase the exchange
market pressure. However, depreciation of the real exchange rate is shown to
increase the market pressure at the current period, contrary to the expectations.
Since this can be attributable to the lag structure between market
fundamentals and the market pressure, 3-, 6-, and 12-month moving average
of each explanatory variable are tried. With 6-month moving average each
                                                
13) The heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are not corrected in the standard regression.
But the logit analysis will be done later.
14) Korea's credit rating by the Standard and Poor's improved from A+(class 5) to AA-(class 4)
in May 1995, but deteriorated to A+ in October 1997. A rise in the rating variable
represents a rise in the class number, namely a worsening in credit ratings.
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variable had the expected sign and became significant.
It is noteworthy that the three variables of the real exchange rate, domestic
credit/GDP and M2/reserve are chosen among the twenty market
fundamentals as the most influential for the Korean crisis. This coincides with
the study of Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b) based on a sample of the
twenty emerging market economies that had crises. They found that the three
variables play the key role in the process leading to the financial crisis and
that the financial crises in emerging markets are self-fulfilling. The next
section tests whether the Korean crisis is self-fulfilling, following their test
method.
4.2. Tests of Self-fulfilling Crisis
Since the crucial difference between the first and the second generation
model is the existence of the multiple equilibria. we must set up a multiple
equilibrium model and empirically investigate whether the conditions for
multiple equilibria hold. Masson (1998) builds the simplified external debt
model of multiple equilibrium exchange rates to assure the satisfaction of the
multiple equilibrium condition in the Asian crisis. This test has merits in that
it is based on the specific multiple equilibrium model. But it is also limited in
that the test is confined to the specific multiple equilibrium model among the
many.
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b) and Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz
(1996) performed the less decent but convenient dummy test for the self-
fulfilling crisis, recognizing that the relationship between the exchange
market pressure and the market fundamentals can change in the crisis zone.
The dummy variable is defined according as the crisis zone is defined. It is
natural to assume that the economy enters the crisis zone when the exchange
market pressure exceeds a certain threshold, ì+ kó(where k is a multiplicative
constant, ì the sample mean of EMP, and ó the standard deviation of EMP).
Figure 3 illustrates two crisis zones. When k=1.5, the crisis zone covers only
four months of March, April, May, and November in 1997. When k=1.1, it
covers February to November except for July and August in 1997 and three
months of October, November, and December in 1990.
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Figure 3  Exchange Market Pressures
Table 2  Tests of Self-fulfilling Properties of the Korean Crisis
EMP
dummy
1
EMP
dummy
2
EMP
dummy
3
M2/
Reserves
Dummy
M2/
Reserves
Dummy
Real
Effective
Exchange
Rate
Dummy
Domestic
Credit/
GDP
Dummy
Constant
Real Effective
Exchange Rate
Domestic Credit
/GDP
M2/Reserves
S&P Ratings
Dummy
REER  ´Dummy
Domestic Credit/
GDP  ´Dummy
M2/Reserves
     ´Dummy
S&P Ratings
     ´Dummy
-0.78
(-3.98)
-0.07
(-2.83)
0.11
(2.43)
0.12
(13.60)
1.15
(3.11)
0.92
(0.08)
-1.33
(-1.51)
-0.28
(-0.19)
0.30
(0.85)
1.08
(1.19)
-0.74
(-4.08)
-0.08
(-3.59)
0.11
(2.93)
0.11
(13.07)
1.31
(3.67)
3.41
(1.17)
-0.30
(-0.97)
-0.38
(-1.29)
0.15
(0.73)
0.10
(0.19)
-0.76
(-4.24)
-0.07
(-2.92)
0.11
(3.24)
0.12
(13.63)
1.14
(3.32)
8.15
(0.50)
0.05
(0.09)
-1.28
(-0.47)
0.50
(0.47)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.51
(-2.79)
-0.15
(-6.99)
0.13
(3.65)
0.17
(9.31)
1.15
(3.71)
0.42
(0.33)
0.24
(4.16)
0.02
(0.27)
-0.12
(-2.77)
0.13
(0.31)
-1.30
(-5.61)
-0.14
(-4.65)
0.25
(5.11)
2.00
(4.81)
2.65
(4.66)
0.18
(2.94)
-0.13
(-1.87)
-0.77
(-1.39)
-1.05
(-6.61)
0.06
(2.03)
0.13
(14.52)
1.39
(5.05)
-0.08
(-0.14)
0.25
(2.80)
-0.06
(-2.55)
-0.32
(-0.44)
-0.78
(-5.39)
0.01
(0.31)
0.12
(13.00)
1.06
(3.26)
1.53
(5.22)
-0.18
(-4.28)
0.04
(1.80)
0.26
(0.60)
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.89 0.81 0.85 0.86
Note: 1) EMP dummy 1 for Jan. to Dec. of 1997, EMP dummy 2 for EMP ³  ì+1.1ó, EMP
dummy 3 for EMP ³  ì+1.5ó .
      2) M2/reserves dummy for the upper 30%, real effective exchange rate for the lower 25%,
domestic credit/GDP dummy for the upper 20%.
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Table 2 reports the results of the dummy test. The EMP dummy 1 to 3 are
defined according to the exchange market pressure. The EMP dummy 1
covers the year of 1997. The EMP dummy 2 corresponds to the case of k=1.1
(EMP≥ì+1.1ó) in Figure 3 and the EMP dummy 3 to k=1.5 (EMP≥ì+1.5ó),
respectively. The dummy is combined with each explanatory variable
including the constant term to capture changes in the investor behavior in the
crisis zone. All EMP dummy variables combined with each explanatory
variable turned out insignificant, implying that the relationship between the
market fundamentals and the exchange market pressure did not change even
after the Korean economy entered the crisis zone. The regression results in
Table 2 do not support the claim that the Korean crisis are self-fulfilling.
It is also possible to define the crisis zone by the critical range of
explanatory variables rather than that of the dependent variable. In Table 2 the
critical range of the M2/reserves, real effective exchange rate, and domestic
credit/GDP was set to the upper 30%, the lower 25%, and the upper 20%,
respectively, in consideration of R2. These dummies combined with each
explanatory variable are also insignificant and, if significant, the signs are
contrary to expectations. Even if we delete the significant but wrong-signed
dummy-combined variables, the remaining dummy-combined variables are
still insignificant
In sum, we could not find concrete evidence for self-fulfilling properties
for the Korean crisis. The results in Table 2 certainly contrast with those of
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b) who found the self-fulfilling properties
in the financial crises of the emerging market economies. But other studies
such as Masson (1998) point out the lack of evidence for self-fulfilling
characteristics in the Korean case, although the Asian crises are contageous.
Since Korea occupies only a small portion in cross-country panel data, we
must be very cautious not to extend the cross-country study results
straightforward to the Korean crisis.
  
4.3. Test of Other Determinants
The previous section underscored the importance of real exchange rate,
domestic credit/GDP and M2/reserves as the determinants of the Korean crisis.
However, the alternative hypotheses on the crisis can be adressed to attest
other fundamental variables. We examine here whether the often-mentioned
causes for the crisis such as fiscal deficit, monetary expansion, capital inflows,
and current account deficit can explain the Korean crisis additionally.
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Table 3  Tests of Other Determinants
Fiscal
balance/
GDP
M2
growth
rate
Excess
Money
Supply
(M1)
Capital
Balance/
GDP
Current
Balance/
GDP
Devaluation
of
neighbors
Coefficient
(t-value)
0.047
(0.316)
0.108
(1.607)
-0.059
(-3.572)
-0.001
(-0.596)
-0.358
(-6.694)
0.009
(0.156)
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.89 0.83
Note: All variables are 6-month moving average of the percentage change from the year
earlier.
4.3.1. Fiscal deficit and monetary expansion
Macroeconomic instability as a result of expansionary monetary and fiscal
policy has been emphasized as the root cause of currency crisis. The domestic
boom under the expansionary policy worsens the current account and fuels
inflationary pressure, resulting in the increased probability of devaluation. But
the loose macroeconomic policy cannot explain the Korean crisis because
Korea maintained the sound macroeconomic stance. When the fiscal
balance/GDP and M2 growth rate are added to the equation (2) in Table 1,
they turn out insignificant as shown in Table 3. The excess M1 supply defined
as in Section 3 is significant but has the wrong sign.
4.3.2. Current and capital account
The currency crisis is closely related to the balance of payments crisis. The
excessive capital inflows or massive current account deficit could create crisis
through various channels. Soon after Korea joined OECD, capital inflows
increased rapidly and current account deficit widened. Many claim that
Korea's capital account liberalization associated with its joining the OECD
stimulated capital inflows that would be reversed to lead to the crisis.
The evidence is that the capital account cannot explain the Korean crisis in
addition to the three key determinants. Despite the fact that the crisis was
associated with the reversal of capital inflows, the capital account did not
have additional explanatory power.
In contrast, current account/GDP seems to explain the crisis, but we should
note that the inclusion of current account/GDP variable make the real
exchange rate insignificant.
4.3.3. Devaluation of neighbors
As the Asian crises erupted in a chain, beginning with the Thailand and
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ending in Korea, the Korean crisis could be understood as the result of the
contagion from the Thai Baht crisis. The devaluation in one country forces the
devaluation of the neighboring country when two countries compete in the
third market. Hence the crisis in one country can spread out to the region.
To check for the domino effect of the devaluation of the neighboring Asian
countries on the Korean economy, we added the pertinent variable, i.e.,
fundamental variable of number (20) in section 3. Table 3 shows that it is
insignificant. The devaluation of currencies of other Asian countries with the
speculative attack do not directly aggravate the foreign exchange market in
Korea.
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis
The crisis index has been defined in equation (1) using the unconditional
variance as weights. However, the crisis index can change very sensitively
with the usage of alternative weights. We check the robustness of the previous
results using conditional variance in place of unconditional variance.
It is assumed that the won depreciation (Äe), percentage point changes of
interest rate (Äi), and percentage changes in foreign reserves (ÄR) from the
year earlier follow the AR-ARCH process. The order of AR and ARCH
process was estimated to be one, respectively. Then the conditional variance
of each AR(1)-ARCH(1) process is calculated. Figure 4 shows the alternative
exchange market pressure as the wighted sum of the conditional variance. The
Table 4  Regression with the Alternative Exchange Market Pressure
Current 6-monthmoving average Current
6-month
moving average
Constant -2.89(-5.98) -1.64(-2.87) -3.61(-8.49) -2.94(-5.36)
REER 0.09(1.38) -0.25(-3.38) 0.16(2.66) -0.19(-2.27)
Domestic
Credit/GDP
0.32(4.04) 0.34(3.25) 0.38(4.80) 0.51(4.82)
M2/Foreign
Reserve
0.37(15.86) 0.39(13.05) 0.38(16.23) 0.41(12.55)
S&P Ratings 2.16(2.82) 3.93(4.64)
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.80 0.85 0.76
Note: 1) Explanatory variables are percentage change from the previous year.
2) Sample period: January 1990-December 1997.
3) Inside the parentheses are t-values.
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Figure 4  Alternative Exchange Market Pressures
        Note: Exchange market pressure 1 uses the unconditional variance, while
exchange market pressure 2 uses conditional variance.
new index varies widely. For example, the exchange market pressure in
December 1997 is measured over 70% using the conditional variance
compared to 20% using the unconditional variance.
Despite the volatility of the newly constructed market pressure, the
variables such as real exchange rate, domestic credit/GDP, M2/foreign
reserves and S&P credit rating continue to be an important set, as shown in
Table 4.
    
5. LOGIT  ANALYSIS
So far we have relied on the exchange market pressure to investigate the
properties of the Korean crisis. However, such quantitative crisis index has its
own drawbacks that the false measurement of the severity of the crisis distorts
the nature of the crisis. Furthermore, the frequency distribution of the
exchange market pressure in Figure 2 is inappropriate for the standard
regression. Therefore we follow the qualitative approach using a dummy
variable instead of quantifying the degree of the crisis.
The exchange market pressure 
*
ty is a function of the fundamental
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variables tx . It is equal to 1 if it exceeds the threshold value q and 0,
otherwise. It is also assumed that the probability of crisis )1Pr( =ty  is the
logistic function of a + bxt – q .
ttt uxy ++= ba
*
                    (2)
,1=ty  if  .
* q³ty
,0=ty   otherwise
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)exp(1
1
)0Pr(
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This approach is called the logit analysis. The previous analysis implicitly
assumes that the higher the exchange market pressure, the more probable the
crisis. In the logit analysis the probability of the crisis is assumed to increase
with the exchange market pressure in a logistic function. The coefficients are
estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation method. 15)
The threshold q can be determined with reference to Figure 3 in which two
crisis zones are shown. Table 5 shows the estimation results when the
threshold is set at k=1.1 (q =2.57%). The three key variables of real exchange
rate, domestic credit/GDP, and M2/reserves are significant with logit
specification, but the real exchange rate has the wrong sign even with six-
month moving average specification. Instead of the real exchange rate
variable, the Korean stock price index (KOSPI) turned out to be significant
and have the right sign. The KOSPI replaces the real exchange rate in the
logit model prabably because it is closely related with the yen/dollar exchange
rate and current account balance.
                                                
15) The logit model is typically used for panel studies but it is used for the time series analysis
in the paper. In this case serial correlation can be a problem. However, one can obtain the
consistent estimator following Robinson (1982) or Grether and Maddala (1982).
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Table 5  Estimation Results of the Logit Model ( k = 1.1 )
Contant
Domestic Credit/
GDP
REER KOSPI
M2/Foreign
Reserve
McFadden
R2
-10.31 0.59 0.33 0.18 0.55
(-3.15) (3.33) (2.07) (2.25)
-13.59 0.43 -0.32 0.18 0.64
6-month
moving
average
(2.48) (2.69) (-2.09) (1.32)
-31.68 1.78 1.12 0.58 0.84
(2.03) (2.06) (1.86) (1.84)
-15.50 0.67 -0.23 0.26 0.68
Contemp
oraneous
(2.48) (2.55) (-2.14) (1.82)
Table 6  Test of the Self-fulfilling Properties of the Korean Crisis
(logit model)
M2/
Foreign Reserve
Dummy
M2/
Foreign Reserve
Dummy
KOSPI
Dummy
Domestic Credit/
GDP Dummy
-17.081 -14.770 -8.569 -13.371
Constant
(-2.325) (-2.889) (-3.549) (-2.048)
0.188 0.125 -0.342
KOSPI
(0.488) (0.426) (-2.026)
1.272 1.633 0.759
Domestic Credit/GDP
(1.278) (1.952) (2.722)
0.665 0.0612 0.216
M2/Foreign Reserve
(1.153) (0.713) (1.017)
-0.624 -0.651 -0.144
Kospi  ´Dummy
(-1.373) (-1.634) (-0.665)
-0.868 -1.193 -0.464Domestic Credit /
GDP  ´Dummy (0.363) (-1.593) (-1.756)
-0.432 0.264 0.094M2 / Foreign Reserve
 ´Dummy (-0.856) (2.111) (0.446)
McFadden R2 0.72 0.68 0.59 0.66
Note: Domestic credit/GDP for the upper 20%, the KOSPI dummy for the lower 25%, and
M2/foreign reserves dummy for the upper 30%.
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Table 7  Test of the Significance of Other Fundamentals (logit model)
Fiscal
balance/
GDP
M2
growth
rate
Excess money
supply(M1)
Capital
account/
GDP
Current
account/
GDP
Devaluation
of neighbors
coefficient (t-
value)
1.615
(1.331)
0.6752
(0.902)
-0.2839
(-0.952)
0.0039
(0.609)
0.7271
(1.644)
0.3402
(1.599)
McFadden R2 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.69 0.69
Note: All variables are 6-month moving averages.
We also tested on the self-fulfilling properties of the Korean crisis in the
logit specification. The EMP dummy cannot be used in the logit model
specified in equation (2) because the dependent variable is also the EMP
dummy variable. Thus only the explanatory variable dummies are used in
Table 6. The estimation results do not support the self-fulfilling story of the
Korean crisis, since the explanatory variables combined with dummy are
insignificant or have wrong sign.
Finally, we performed the significance test on the other fundamental
variables such as fiscal balance/GDP, M2 growth rate, excess M1 supply,
capital account/GDP, current account/GDP, and devaluation of neighbors
with specification of the logit model. Again these variables turned out to be
insignificant under the qualitative crisis index and the crisis probability of the
logistic function.
6 .  CONCLUSION
This paper carried out empirical research on the causes of the Korean crisis
and found that the Korean crisis was not self-fulfilling. The excessive lending
and insufficient foreign reserves coupled with real appreciation mostly
explains the crisis. The dummy test on the self-fulfilling properties of the
crisis did not support the hypothesis that the Korean crisis was largely caused
by the self-fulfilling expectations. The sharp depreciation of the Baht and
other Asian currencies during the second half of 1997 did not exert the
contagious effect on the Korean crisis.
The evidence is that excessive lending at financial institutions and
mismanagement of foreign reserves as well as real appreciation or the
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sluggish stock market heighten economic vulnerability. These fundamental
weaknesses remain the primary cause of the Korean crisis.
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